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Abstract As the empirical study of action control via
ideomotor effect anticipations continues to uncover more
and more aspects of this fundamental process, it is time to
look back to the 19th century roots of the theory to assess
which classical ideas are supported by contemporary
research. In turn, classic ideas might stimulate studies on
aspects of the ideomotor mechanism that have not yet been
addressed empirically. The present article is a tribute to this
classical work—more precisely to the article ‘‘Der Apparat
des Willens’’ [The Apparatus of Will], published by Emil
Harleß 150 years ago. At a closer look, Harleß does not
only present a concise description of the ideomotor
mechanism; he also presents a wealth of intriguing ideas
that deserve empirical investigation.
Early ideomotor theory
Over the last two decades, ideomotor theory as a 19th
century philosophical approach to human action has stim-
ulated numerous intriguing experiments on this funda-
mental mechanism (for recent reviews see Nattkemper,
Ziessler, & Frensch, 2010; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010).
While these experiments steadily increased our under-
standing of the ideomotor mechanism, classical compre-
hensive accounts of ideomotor action control are about to
fall into oblivion. Symptomatically, of the several hundred
papers on ideomotor theory published to date, only one
targeted earlier formulations of the theory (Stock & Stock,
2004).1
Among these earlier formulations are several compre-
hensive accounts for ideomotor theory, starting with
Herbart’s (1825) Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu ge-
gru¨ndet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik, and
continuing with Lotze’s (1852) Medicinische Psychologie
oder Physiologie der Seele and Harleß’ (1861) Der
Apparat des Willens. These classical works offer a wealth
of intriguing ideas and point towards important questions
that contemporary research has not answered yet. Still,
they are not as well known as would be expected based on
their potential merit for contemporary research. At least
two factors are responsible for this circumstance: First,
most classical treatises clearly differ from contemporary
research papers in that their length exceeds the concise
format of the latter ones where relevant information is
assumed to be more readily extractable from a minimum of
pages. The second factor is obvious from the titles cited
above: most comprehensive 19th century accounts of
ideomotor theory were written in German language and
are thus inaccessible to the majority of contemporary
researchers. The present article aims at making the most
concise of these classical accounts (Harleß, 1861) available
to the English-speaking world. To this end, the following
sections first provide a few biographical notes on the author
and continue with a summary of the key points in his Der
Apparat des Willens.
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Emil Harleß’ and the ‘‘physiological-psychological
mechanism’’
In contrast to his philosophical predecessors Herbart and
Lotze, Emil Harleß (Fig. 1) was a physiologist, who had
studied medicine, physics, and chemistry in Wu¨rzburg and
Berlin (Meyers Konversationslexikon 1885-1892). During
the first years of his academic career at the University of
Erlangen, he focused on experiments on general anaes-
thetic drugs and published a seminal report in this area
together with Ernst von Bibra (Bibra & Harleß, 1847).
Only after becoming a full professor at the University of
Munich (Martin, 1857) he started to investigate the ‘‘phy-
siological-psychological mechanism’’, what would today
be subsumed under the terms physiological psychology or
cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Harleß, 1862). One year
before his death—exactly 150 years ago—he published an
article where he discussed ideomotor theory in the broader
framework of the mind–body problem. This article—Der
Apparat des Willens [The Apparatus of Will]—is arguably
the most concise and comprehensive account for ideomotor
action formulated prior to James’s (1890/1981) Principles
of Psychology (cf. Hommel, 2003; Stock & Stock, 2004). It
contains a wealth of innovative ideas, some of which have
already received empirical support and others that are just
now being addressed by experimental studies. An English
translation of the Apparatus of Will is available as sup-
plementary online material whereas the following sections
highlight its most important ideas for contemporary
research.2
The Apparatus of Will and future directions
Contemporary accounts of ideomotor theory concentrate
on the immediate role of sensory anticipations for the
production of motor actions (Hoffmann, 1993, 2003;
Hommel, 2009; Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001; Kunde, 2001, 2003). To the contrary, Harleß
(1861) conceives ideomotor theory as a broader approach
to the philosophical mind–body problem, including the
classical controversy about human free will and related
issues such as its legal implications. Consequently, the first
part of the article (‘‘The foundations of voluntary action’’)
contains a thorough discussion of the relationship of vol-
untariness, consciousness, and purposefulness of voluntary
actions.
Regarding this distinction, Harleß (1861) arrives at the
interesting conclusion that an action is most likely to
appear voluntary to an observer if it does not serve an
apparent purpose, i.e., when it does not seem to be moti-
vated by situational demands (labelled incidental actions).
The conclusion that such incidental actions give rise to the
most intense impression of voluntariness is supported by
several recent studies on imitation behaviour. In these
studies, human infants and chimpanzees tended to imitate
unusual object-oriented actions, such as pressing a button
with one’s forehead, only if the agent could have used his
hands easily instead of the forehead but not if the agent’s
hands were occupied (e.g., Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call,
& Tomasello, 2007; Gergely, Bekkering, & Kira´ly, 2002).
In accordance with Harleß’ deduction, actions that do not
seem to be motivated by situational demands (in this
case: having his hands free instead of carrying an object),
do indeed seem to have a special influence on the
observer. The discussion of such incidental actions also
leads to a fine-grained analysis of voluntary action. For
instance, Harleß suggested that voluntary actions do
comprise decisions about whether an action should be
carried out at all—a notion that was recently taken up in
Fig. 1 Emil Harleß (1820–1862) and the original title of his
‘‘Apparat des Willens’’ [Apparatus of Will] (1861). Adapted with
permission from Unschuld (1989, p. 34); ‘‘Archiv Bereich Physiol-
ogie und Physiologische Chemie, Sammlung W. Koller, Munich’’
2 Translating a 19th century German article into modern English is
difficult for a number of reasons. Most importantly, a translation that
is close to the original wording will effectively obscure its gist in most
instances because of the completely different approach to scientific
writing that is obvious from many classical treatises. For this reason,
we focused on the meaning of the text at the expense of a limited
conservation of its original style. Following the same line of
argument, we introduced subheadings as a major stylistic change to
make the text more accessible.
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the What-When-Whether model of intentional action
(Brass & Haggard, 2008).
The first part of the article ends with the claim that
incidental actions are the key to understanding voluntary
actions in general. This idea was addressed in various
recent studies where the term ‘incidental actions’ was
substituted by the concepts of self-initiated (Jahanshahi
et al., 1995), endogenous (Astor-Jack & Haggard, 2005),
and intention-based actions (Herwig, Prinz, & Waszak,
2007; Pfister, Kiesel, & Melcher, 2010). The question of
how such actions—in contrast to immediate reactions to
external stimuli—might promote ideomotor learning or the
anticipation of distal action effects is just now being
addressed by empirical studies (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009;
Haering & Kiesel, (2011); Herwig et al., 2007; Herwig &
Waszak, 2009; Janczyk, Pfister, & Kunde, (2011); Pfister
et al., 2010; Pfister, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2011; Stock &
Hoffmann, 2002; Wolfensteller & Ruge, (2011)).
The second part of the article (‘‘The physiology of inci-
dental actions’’) is concerned with the physiological
implementation of voluntary actions in general and inci-
dental actions in particular. Like other physiologists of his
time (e.g., Laycock, 1845), Harleß (1861) assumes two
qualitatively different functional units of the nervous sys-
tem: a sensory unit (sensorium) and a motor unit (motorium).
Accordingly, activations have to be relayed from the former
system to the latter system in order to produce adaptive
action. A considerable proportion of the article is devoted to
this question which has had a relatively limited impact on
contemporary research. Notable exceptions include recent
neuroimaging studies on the acquisition of bidirectional
action-effect associations (Elsner et al., 2002; Melcher,
Weidema, Eenshuistra, Hommel, & Gruber, 2008), the
sensory nature of effect anticipations (Ku¨hn, Seurinck, Fias,
& Waszak, 2010; Ku¨hn, Keizer, Rombouts, & Hommel,
2011), and the electrophysiological signature of effect
anticipations (Waszak & Herwig, 2007; Nikolaev, Ziessler,
van Leeuwen, & Dimova, 2008). In this respect, Harleß
seems to have foreseen the advent of neuroimaging methods
in claiming that ‘‘activity of the soul’’ will inevitably
increase the blood flow in the activated brain regions—
preparing the theoretical stage for an fMRI analysis of
ideomotor processes. Still, however, the neurophysiological
mechanisms that relay effect anticipations to motor centres
are virtually unknown and will have to be uncovered in the
years to come. A promising start in this enterprise might be
the integration of ideomotor theory and recent concepts in
computational neuroscience, such as forward and inverse
models (e.g., Wolpert & Kawato, 1998).
A third part of Harleß’ (1861) article covers the acqui-
sition of bidirectional action-effect representations for
humans and animals (‘‘The acquisition of behavioural
competence’’). Like prior accounts (Lotze, 1852), this
description is relatively vague; yet, it suggests an important
role of incidental movements during prenatal development.
This discussion already contains important thoughts about
the contextual nature of action-effect representations that
were later addressed empirically (Hoffmann & Sebald,
2000; Kiesel & Hoffmann, 2004). The later ontogenetic
development of action-effect representations is not covered
in the Apparatus of Will but is certainly an important
addition to the considerations raised by Harleß (e.g., Een-
shuistra, Weidema, & Hommel, 2004; Karbach, Kray, &
Hommel, 2011; Verschoor, Weidema, Biro, & Hommel,
2010). Interestingly, Harleß explicitly suggested the
acquisition of action-effect representations to be subjected
to preparedness for learning specific action-effect relations
while other relations are much harder to acquire. Even
though this notion was empirically tested in operant
conditioning experiments with rodents (Bolles, 1970;
Randolph, 1986) it has not yet been applied to human
agents.3
The major part of Harleß’ (1861) article describes a
physiologically motivated schematic of action control via
ideomotor effect anticipations (‘‘A physiological-psycho-
logical mechanism for voluntary actions’’; Fig. 2). Inter-
estingly, Harleß already employed the modern term of
action effects and pointed towards the contextual depen-
dence of action-effect associations (Hoffmann, 1993;
Hoffmann & Sebald, 2000). In contrast to contemporary
experiments which exclusively studied the situational
context, Harleß proposed a much broader definition,
including the internal context such as the current mood or
arousal level. Whereas the internal context has been
investigated in other domains of psychology (e.g., regard-
ing mood-congruent memory; Bower, 1981), its role for
ideomotor processes still has to be uncovered. Furthermore,
Harleß explicitly discusses the role of proximal and dif-
ferent types of distal effects—a discussion that empirical
studies are just now beginning to take up (Janczyk, Skirde,
Weigelt, & Kunde, 2009). Importantly, Harleß also
emphasises a unique role of the valence of actions and their
effects for acquisition and application of action-effect
associations that, up to now, has only played a minor role
for contemporary research and theory (but see Beckers, De
Houwer, & Eelen, 2002; Eder, Mu¨sseler, & Hommel,
(2011); Kunde, Lozo, & Neumann, (2011)). Both, the
distinction between proximal and distal feedback and the
role of valenced action effects, have direct implications for
future research. Action effects are no longer to be seen as a
homogenous class of events that are only defined by their
3 In contrast to the study of preparedness, there is another striking
imbalance regarding the explicit study of ideomotor action-effect
associations which was almost exclusively studied with human
participants. A notable exception is a study on action-effect associ-
ations in the fruit fly Drosophila (Gerber & Hendel, 2006).
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contingent mapping to an action. To the contrary, the exact
properties of action effects have to be taken into account to
arrive at a clearer understanding of their role for human and
non-human action control.
Conclusions
The preceding sections aimed at exemplifying how Harleß’
(1861) conception of the Apparatus of Will might guide
future research on ideomotor action control. Two further
points, however, should not be forgotten. The first point is
concerned with theoretical underpinnings of ideomotor
action control. Since Harleß’ days, major theoretical
advances were sparse and centred about the learning
mechanisms of Anticipatory Behavioural Control (Hoff-
mann, 1993, 2003) and the immediate interface of per-
ception and action as conceptualised in the Theory of Event
Coding (Hommel et al., 2001; see also Hommel, 2004,
2009). Still, ideomotor theory has remained a relatively
vague idea—a metatheoretical framework to integrate
empirical findings with limited capabilities for deriving
predictions for a specific experimental setting. Future the-
oretical developments are needed to overcome this status:
Which circumstances promote the anticipation of distal
action effects? What is the role of emotional states in
ideomotor processing? Is it possible to derive a computa-
tional framework for ideomotor theory?
These questions point at important theoretical develop-
ments in order to integrate the available evidence. Yet,
such an enterprise can only be effective if the insights from
ideomotor research and theory can be effectively dissemi-
nated to those outside the immediate scientific community.
In the words of Emil Harleß (1861, p. 73): ‘‘May the appeal
of this secret, which everybody carries within him- or
herself, help to attract attention to this isolated chapter of
physiological psychology […] also from a much broader
point of view.’’
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